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Abstract: Climate change risk assessment involves formal analysis of the 
consequences, likelihoods and responses to the impacts of climate change and the 
options for addressing these under societal constraints. Conventional approaches to 
risk assessment are challenged by the significant temporal and spatial dynamics of 
climate change; by the amplification of risks through societal preferences and values; 
and through the interaction of multiple risk factors. This paper introduces the theme 
issue by reviewing the current practice and frontiers of climate change risk assessment, 
with specific emphasis on the development of adaptation policy that aims to manage 
those risks. These frontiers include integrated assessments, dealing with climate risks 
across borders and scales, addressing systemic risks, and innovative co-production 
methods to prioritize solutions to climate challenges with decision-makers. By 
reviewing recent developments in the use of largescale risk assessment for adaptation 
policy-making, we suggest a forward-looking research agenda to meet ongoing 
strategic policy requirements in local, national and international contexts.  
 1. Climate change challenges and the role of risk assessment 
Climate change is a major challenge to society and to the ability of individual and 
collective decision-making to enact meaningful responses. In many senses, it is unlike 
other environmental problems facing humanity in its temporal scale and in its complex 
relationship between human agency, embedded social structures and emerging 
environmental system interactions [1]. In economic terms, climate change represents 
what Nick Stern [2] refers to as the greatest market failure the world has ever seen. 
Ross Garnaut suggested that failing to adequately deal with the consequences of 
climate change ‘would haunt humanity till the end of time’ [3, p. 597]. 
Climate change creates cascading risks in physical systems, ecosystems, economy and 
society, often inter-related and creating the circumstances for irreversible and 
undesirable crossing of thresholds at multiple scales. To assess climate risks across 
domains, and in a manner meaningful to decision-makers, is therefore a major 
scientific challenge. 
Hence the scientific and analytical approach to the climate change challenge requires 
the inclusion of systematic complexity and the ability to incorporate perhaps normally 
unthinkable and non-obvious elements to decision-oriented framing. At the same 
time, policy-makers are under pressure to make decisions on climate change which 
intersect with many other policy domains and have both immediate, short-term 
consequences and perhaps more profound, long-term implications. This includes 
decisions on mitigation strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and climate 
change forcing, and on adaptation strategies which aim to manage existing and future 
effects of climate change that are unavoidable, and which are the primary policy focus 
for this theme issue. This issue brings together multiple perspectives on large-scale 
climate change risk assessment to investigate challenges in the use of risk-based 
concepts and expert assessment as well as the management of uncertainty over 
different time scales. 
At its simplest, the object of risk analysis concerns the loss or gain of something of 
value, and is most commonly associated with the consequences of an action or event 
multiplied by its likelihood. Risk framing incorporates, however, multiple dimensions 
of the societal context of decision-making such that, while some risks are observable, 
or emergent for interactions in the physical world, other risks include indirect, systemic 
ones or relate to collective and political systems rather than to individuals. 
 Risk assessment involves both formal methods and processes to delineate and 
evaluate risks, through to everyday practices of how individuals act, from trivial 
decisions of wearing a coat when there is a probability of rain, through to major 
decisions on where people live, move or invest their resources. Risk assessment, in 
general, is a process to comprehend the nature and to determine the level of risk [4]. 
Importantly, any risk assessment is purposeful, most often conducted to inform a 
particular type of decision and action. This usually requires the measurement of risk—
facilitating a comparison between different risks and an understanding of possible 
impacts, often presented through models or scenarios. Risk assessment has, therefore, 
become institutionalized as common practice in government, business and other 
organizations, to guide actions based upon an evaluation of their consequences 
accompanied by prioritization of measures to reduce downside and negative 
consequences (e.g. [5]). Risk science is particularly evident in the context of disaster, 
where growing understanding of the interplay between hazard, vulnerability and 
exposure has led to ever more comprehensive and sophisticated risk models and 
assessment methods [6]. 
In government, many policy-making decisions are concerned with risk management 
and prioritization through the development of standard rules and guidance to reduce 
the prospect for adverse consequences. As the landscape of risks evolves due to 
macro-scale drivers of change, such as urbanization, economic development and land-
use changes and other emergent factors, scientific advice can be crucial to rationalize 
these based upon current knowledge, and, if there are competing interpretations of 
risk, to explain why in the clearest possible terms [7]. 
There are two important social elements of risk pertinent for risk assessment. The first 
is the so-called social amplification of risk, whereby responses to perceived outcomes, 
either in anticipation or in reaction, change the landscape of likelihood or 
consequence. In other words, reactions such as aversion, fear or greed will affect both 
the likelihood and the distribution of consequences in society. Second, consequences 
of loss of legitimacy or control are central to institutional or political risks: these types 
of risks affect what is defined as downside risk and where efforts are made in response. 
The lessons from decades of analysis and experience of risk are, therefore, that risks 
are neither neutral nor fixed [8]. 
Risk assessment based on a reductive approach to risk was designed for familiar 
systems and well-defined issues; it has been shown to be less appropriate under 
conditions of uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance, when reduction to a single risk 
metric or policy recommendation cannot be scientifically justified [9–12]. 
 Furthermore, traditional risk assessment has been based on historic data—assessing 
probabilities of severity, frequency and impact based on experience from past events. 
In times of global change, this approach is no longer adequate to capture future risks. 
Furthermore, in a decision-making context, inherent uncertainty associated with 
climate change has been used to show that a conventional ‘predict then act’ framing 
is paralysed by limits to prediction, whereas an ‘assess risk of policy’ framing can act 
as a better stimulus for action by showing where existing policy objectives may be 
threatened [13]. Limitations of a reductive approach to risk also become apparent 
when comparative risk assessment is used as a form of evidence synthesis, across 
diverse evidence sources. 
Risk registers aim to rank by severity and present risk dimensions in visual format, 
typically using a two-axes graph of likelihood and impact. At country level, national risk 
registers are, therefore, seen as important developments that aim to synthesize, rank 
and communicate multiple threats to national security [14]. Critiques of such risk-
ranking approaches have recognized their utility for risk governance, especially by 
increasing the profile of severe and emerging issues, but also highlighted the need for 
better characterization of risks and issues associated with differential coping potentials 
[14,15]. Challenges also remain in integrating all relevant evidence and effectively 
communicating uncertainty in risk assessments to decisionmakers rather than 
conflating it within an apparent objective measure of probabilistic likelihood of an 
event [12]. 
Risk is therefore a complex and dynamic concept, multi-facetted and continuously 
changing, with new risk emerging constantly in a time of growing interdependencies 
[16,17]. The role of risk science in addressing complex global problems, therefore, 
continues to be refined as concepts and approaches are re-defined to address new 
challenges. Key issues in risk assessment are whether uncertainties in evaluation of 
likelihood or consequences can be reduced; whether reducing uncertainties actually 
leads to more effective decision-making; whether accuracy is necessary for adaptation; 
and whether systemic elements can be incorporated where the risks are potentially 
unforeseen or unknowable. 
Uncertainty is an inherent feature of risk assessment, and its treatment and 
communication have received significant interest in the literature, as highlighted by 
the earlier Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A theme issue ‘Responding and adapting to climate 
change: uncertainty as knowledge’ [18]. Indeed, much fundamental climate science 
has sought to reduce uncertainties around the parameters of future changes. Cox et 
al. [19], for example, attempt to quantify climate sensitivity for a doubling of 
 atmospheric CO2 and derive likelihoods for the lower bound (less than 3% for 1.5°C) 
and upper bound (less than 1% for 4°C) ranges. They argue that knowing these 
likelihoods for best and worst-case scenarios is important for strategic decision-
making. By contrast, Dessai et al. [20] argue that accurate prediction of climate is not 
an impediment to adaptation decision-making, and that robust adaptation requires 
actions that meet evaluation criteria (such as effectiveness and fairness), whatever the 
plausible range of future climatic changes. They show that risk assessment requires 
high predictive skill when there are limited alternatives and when the outcomes are 
known and well constrained. For many adaptation decisions, such conditions do not 
hold: there are numerous options, uncertainties are large and decision-makers may 
not have experience in using such predictions [20]. Hence risk assessment is not simply 
about better prediction of likelihood or consequence. Moreover, reducing 
uncertainties is only one means by which progress towards adaptation occurs. 
2. Current practice in climate change risk assessment 
Given the diversity of approaches and the complexity of risk assessment, many public 
bodies with statutory obligations and private bodies with responsibility to 
shareholders have implemented formal risk assessments of climate change impacts. 
Across the spectrum of experience, they frame and prioritize climate change risks 
alongside other risks in order to implement timely responses. At the level of global 
public concern, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have described 
the advantages of a risk-based approach in terms of improved understanding of both 
the dynamic interactions of risk factors (spatial and temporal) that lead to specific 
climate change impacts, and the role of adaptation initiatives in managing these risk 
factors. Both the Special Report on Extreme Events [21] and the Fifth Assessment 
Report [22] sought to characterize key global risks linked to current policy responses 
to provide recommendations for further intergovernmental action [23]. Similarly, risk 
assessment has also been highlighted as a key procedure at national scale to facilitate 
targeted adaptation strategies and coordinated risk governance (e.g. USA [24]). 
The IPCC’s Special Report on Extreme Events [21] brought together the different 
schools of thought that had emerged under disaster risk management and climate 
change adaptation by including science from both fields. The report challenged the 
prevailing approach of assessing risks without considering the dynamic socio-economic 
aspects that drive exposure and vulnerability [21]. The resulting climate risk 
framework has become the basis for a new generation of climate change risk 
assessments that are explicit about the underlying and structural nature of 
vulnerability. As a further development, climate risk-based approaches are also now 
 being further integrated with disaster risk reduction concepts as complementary 
initiatives to develop proactive strategies for managing extreme events [25]. 
Cumulative risks at national and global level are also linked to discourse on the key 
principle of avoiding dangerous climate change as defined by the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) [26]. This principle is now strongly attached 
to assumed risk thresholds of +1.5°C and +2°C global warming above pre-industrial 
level as defined by the 2015 UNFCCC Paris Accord to provide the rationale for 
complementary adaptation and mitigation actions. Risk assessment at higher 
magnitudes of climate change has also identified the additional consequences from 
exceeding these thresholds, notably the scale of disruption associated with a 
benchmark +4°C global warming above pre-industrial, which remains a possibility 
under ‘business as usual’ greenhouse gas emissions [27]. 
The importance of climate change risk assessments is recognized politically through 
the existing global frameworks that attempt to lead global action: the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Warsaw International 
Mechanism for Loss and Damage (L&D) as well as the Sendai Framework for Disaster 
Risk Reduction (SFDRR), coordinated by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (UNISDR), all underline the importance of evidence-based risk assessment 
to guide public policy. 
However, the complexity of climate change suggests that it is not the type of well-
defined problem suited to conventional risk assessment, and IPCC report procedures 
have evolved in the face of this challenge [28]. Hence, innovations in risk methodology 
and communication have been developed, sometimes drawing on parallel 
developments to address other wicked problems [29–31]. For example, a now familiar 
technique is the development and application of scenarios for climate change 
assessments to represent diverse future pathways beyond the range of conventional 
prediction techniques or probabilistic likelihoods used in conventional risk 
assessments. A perhaps more radical innovation for risk assessment is to recognize 
that much uncertainty in climate change assessments is irreducible and to treat this 
not as a barrier but as a source of ‘actionable knowledge’ through its influence on the 
viability of different decision strategies [32]. A further development is to recognize that 
climate change may also provide opportunities, and hence to position risk assessment 
as a mechanism to evaluate both positive and negative aspects of change in the 
context of a balanced appraisal of alternative decision options. 
 3. Overview of contributing articles 
This collection of papers examines different approaches to climate risk assessment 
across the natural and social domains, with a special focus on how they can inform 
interventions and plans to minimize and manage the risks. The papers offer new 
insights into the multi-scalar and nested nature of risk assessment, drawing on global 
risks that become meaningful to decisionmakers at national and local scales. 
Distinctive challenges can, therefore, be identified in linking the strategic needs of 
adaptation policy with the evolving science of risk and across the many academic 
disciplines contributing to climate change science. 
Many of the papers in this theme issue build on experience of the UK Climate Change 
Risk Assessment (UKCCRA) [33] as well as international expertise in national level risk 
assessments, focusing on the methodological advancements and challenges recently 
experienced. 
Warren et al. [34] evaluate developments in the UKCCRA methodology. The origins of 
the UKCCRA were linked to aspirations to include climate change risks on a National 
Risk Register. The first assessment completed in 2012 was criticized by some 
commentators for being overtechnical, as exemplified by use of risk metrics to quantify 
changing risk profiles which were more suited for some risks compared to others. 
Hence, Warren et al. [34] describe how the methodology was refined for the second 
assessment completed in 2017, including assessment of both present-day and future 
vulnerability, and provide a focus on the urgency of adaptation action and a structure 
focused around systems of receptors rather than conventional sectors. The 
methodological changes reflect an evolution from a ‘science-first’ assessment to a 
‘policy-first’ assessment to provide improved relevance to adaptation policy. 
Procedures are, therefore, more action-oriented than the IPCC reporting process. 
Sectoral or quasi-sectoral experience with climate change risk assessment offer 
insights into application and methodological challenges that researchers and policy-
makers face when conducting national climate risk assessments. Dawson et al. [35] 
evaluate climate risks across UK infrastructure sectors through a systems approach. 
They find that the understanding of risks to individual infrastructure sectors has 
improved but is still lagging for risks from interconnectivities and interdependencies. 
Brown [36] describes how an ecosystem-based approach was used to assess risks for 
the natural environment and its multiple societal benefits. The challenge here is 
related not only to establishing consistency and hence priorities across diverse systems 
 and receptors but also to understanding the nature of risk related to objectives and 
hence the rationale for adaptation policy. 
Surminski et al. [37] investigate climate risks across the wide diversity of business 
interests and industry sectors, identifying several methodological challenges for 
incorporating these into national-level climate risk assessments, most notably the 
diverse nature of evidence, interdependencies across value chains and business 
relationships, and the impact of policy and regulation. 
A key methodological advancement of UKCCRA2 is the recognition of the international 
dimension of climate risk and adaptation policy. Challinor et al. [38] explore this in the 
context of risk transmission across international boundaries, which are linked to 
mechanisms such as price, material flows, movement of people and political stability, 
with specific emphasis on food security and geopolitical risks. 
The experiences from the UKCCRA process are complemented by two national-level 
perspectives for Italy and Mexico, showcasing methodologies and challenges of 
applying risk assessments across scales: Mysiak et al. [39] describes the climate risk 
index for Italy, which was initially developed to inform the National Climate Adaptation 
Plan in Italy and offers improvements in the underlying assessment methods through 
more detailed model ensemble data and a more robust analysis. The results of the 
analysis are used to rank the subnational administrative and statistical units according 
to the climate risk challenges, and inform financial resource allocation for climate 
adaptation in Italy. 
Haer et al. [40] conduct a country-scale study of future flood risk in Mexico, illustrating 
how the application of global models can inform cost–benefit analyses to prioritize 
investments in flood adaptation strategies under future climate scenarios in data-
scarce countries. The methodology applied here is particularly relevant because local 
data are often lacking, incomplete or inconsistent. 
The collection of papers concludes with reflections on the application of risk 
assessment: McDermott & Surminski [41] explore the challenges of translating risk 
assessment into action at the local city level. Their exploratory study at city scale in 
Cork, Ireland, shows how normative interpretations of climate risk assessment affect 
local decision-making, highlighting that, despite ever more accurate data and an 
increasing range of theoretical approaches available to local decision-makers, there 
are fundamental challenges that can hamper action. 
 The concluding commentary from Brown et al. [42] is written from the perspective of 
the Climate Change Committee, which oversees the UKCCRA and provides 
independent guidance to the UK government on policy development. The authors 
describe how the UKCCRA has acted as a primer for research and knowledge exchange 
across the science–policy interface, and outline how the utilization of the risk 
assessment could be improved further. 
4. Future directions for risk assessment 
The contributions to this theme issue and the wider emerging science of risk 
assessment point to a number of frontier issues relevant for assessing the risks 
associated with climate change in a policy-based context. These include the issue of 
dealing with systemic risks, together with critical knowledge gaps regarding 
biophysical and Earth system processes, and the complexity of societal responses, 
which could collectively lead to extremely challenging outcomes. Other issues relate 
to risk assessment processes themselves, such as dealing with uncertainty or managing 
the diversity of evidence. And finally, the interplay between adaptation action, policy 
and risk levels is not well understood and requires further investigation. We reflect on 
each in turn and identify possible responses. 
The first challenge in risk assessment for global climate change is undoubtedly the 
complexity and myriad of interacting factors. For every incremental change in 
greenhouse gases and temperature, there are diverse responses in climatological, 
ecological, hydrological and other biophysical systems, ranging from short-term effects 
on primary productivity, through to longer-term changes such as sea-level rise, 
weathering or soil formation; coupling of systems means that responses also affect 
other systems, including feedbacks to climate. In addition, climate change risks are 
shaped by complex interactions with socio-economic drivers, together with individual 
or collective responses to risk through planned and more reactive adaptation. All these 
interactions indicate high propensity for indirect effects and systemic risks that 
cascade through multiple receptors, especially during and following extreme events. 
Advances in attribution of extreme events allow greater identification of where 
individual events have moved into the realm of anthropogenic climate change, and 
methods in specific areas of hydrology and meteorology are improving risk profiling 
through assessments of changes in event magnitude and frequency (e.g. [43]). But the 
key challenge is to identify how systemic risks cascade through interdependent 
networks, including for infrastructure, businesses, vulnerable communities, 
ecosystems and ecosystem services. 
 There is now also increased recognition of systemic risks extending beyond national 
jurisdictions, but accompanying concerns regarding rather limited information on their 
structure and potential consequences [16]. As Challinor et al. [38] argue, the presence 
of political boundaries across natural systems such as seas and watersheds represent 
a barrier, and sometimes an amplification of risks. 
Conventional risk assessment methods, and indeed other policy appraisal tools, are ill-
equipped to deal with interaction effects, and with multiple time scales. In this theme 
issue, there are a range of new perspectives on how to assess these interdependencies 
and interactions, for example, Dawson et al.’s systems approach for infrastructure 
[35], the business-function framework for risks to industry and business applied by 
Surminski et al. [37], and the risk transmission framing in Challinor et al. [38] showcase 
methodological advances. However, they all also conclude that further 
interdisciplinary advances in integrated assessment approaches that link dynamic 
biophysical and socio-economic components of risk exposure and vulnerability are 
required (see also [44]). Similarly, Brown [36] suggests a key step towards a better 
understanding of these interactions is to use system thinking and sensitivity testing to 
identify key linkages and the potential for critical transitions, including the role of 
humans as modifying agents for terrestrial, freshwater, coastal and marine 
ecosystems. By engaging with practitioners, risk assessment can not only include their 
valuable specialist knowledge, but also map out the transmission of risk across sectors 
and scales, recognizing also that complete avoidance of risk is probably unviable and 
impracticable. 
Interaction of climate with a variety of processes of global environmental change 
represents an increased need for methodological triangulation to identify and 
characterize multiple stressors and their interactions across different scales [45]. This 
will require further innovations in scenario development to incorporate coevolution of 
drivers, for example, using the IPCC Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP) framework 
[46] at national and regional scale, and the incorporation of empirical data into 
attribution frameworks using innovative techniques such as data pooling over large 
areas to discriminate confounding factors. A methodological shift for risk assessment 
can also be witnessed in approaches allowing greater reflection on the social 
construction of risk and how this influences vulnerability and exposure. Tools such as 
agent-based models or qualitative investigations of human behaviour can help to 
capture those dynamics, but their inclusion into climate risk assessment models is still 
underdeveloped [47]. While risk science has become more inter-disciplinary, 
embracing the skills and knowledge gained in the social sciences, there is a strong call 
 for more efforts to improve analytics and make this more applicable to decision-
makers. 
Unknown Earth system responses and unknowable future societal responses lead in 
effect to deep uncertainty within climate change risk assessment. In the face of this 
deep uncertainty, there are a number of potential strategies. These include the need 
to portray a full range of extreme future scenarios, and being explicit concerning the 
possible goals of adaptation responses [48]. 
The second challenge to climate risk assessment stems from the diversity of evidence 
and varieties in underlying assumptions, in the use of scenarios, and in the prior 
questions of determining the scope of assessment. One of the main bottlenecks in 
understanding risk dynamics is limited availability and relevance of existing data. This 
is a challenge identified by all papers, but it can also be an opportunity for innovation, 
as shown by Haer et al. [40], who test the application of global datasets to run national 
and state-level risk assessments in Mexico as a possible way to circumvent data-
scarcity. A similar comment applies to Mysiak et al.’s [39] climate risk index for Italy. 
Importantly, despite any advances in risk quantification, expert judgement remains at 
the heart of assessment: to evaluate different evidence sources, establish the degree 
of scientific consensus and communicate confidence levels. A challenge noted in 
several papers in this theme issue and from the US National Assessment [49] has been 
to develop a consistent framing of risk and treatment of uncertainties across multiple 
stressors and receptors. Particularly for highly contested issues, there remains scope 
for further development of structured evidence appraisals, such as by pedigree and 
uncertainty assessment [50]. Such refinements are especially necessary due to the 
potential contestation of climate change actions which makes it important that risk 
assessment can show a transparent audit trail that cautiously and rigorously justifies 
the interpretation of scientific evidence, particularly when model-based results are 
involved [51,52]. 
All formal climate change risk assessments are structured by underlying values and 
normative goals that are sometimes explicit and sometimes hidden. These values 
include societal attitudes to the intrinsic value of nature, through to collective aversion 
to loss and dread, irreversibility, as well as implicit judgements on the acceptability or 
aversion to inequality in society. Climate risks associated with land use, for example, 
are dramatically different when agricultural policy incentives prioritize food 
production over environmental protection, as evidenced in land management in the 
UK contributing significantly to lowland flood risk [53]. These trade-offs may lead to 
 maladaptation as uncoordinated responses to climate change exacerbate risk, as 
Brown [36] identified for different types of ecosystem services. Barnett et al. [54], for 
example, highlight how individuals are averse to irreversible loss, and these are often 
articulated through attachment to places, to iconic artefacts or other representations 
of culture. Hence formal risk assessment can deviate from making meaningful 
statements on priorities, when these normative goals fail to be recognized. Even in 
situations where data are available and presented to decision-makers, as in the Cork 
example provided by McDermott & Surminski [41], it is important to understand the 
underlying assumptions and limitations of a risk assessment. This requires 
transparency and close engagement between those who conduct the risk assessment 
and those who commission or use it [42]. 
The third frontier area is that of uncertainty management to support science–policy 
interactions. Uncertainty management is crucial to further developments across the 
science–policy interface. Conventional appraisal procedures used for policy decisions 
(e.g. cost–benefit analysis) have been shown to have a tendency to close down too 
rapidly to a small set of options by defining uncertainty too narrowly [55]. In climate 
change policy, an adaptation deficit can be defined in terms of the gap between 
residual risks that are intolerable for society and current adaptation responses. 
However, the presence of irreducible or deep uncertainty identifies that such a gap 
should not be seen as just a knowledge deficit issue which may be associated with a 
‘wait and see’ or incremental response. Instead, developments in risk science suggest 
that deep uncertainty needs to be recognized through innovative procedures and 
actions that are more participatory, risk-informed and precautionary in response, 
rather than following a conventional risk-based approach based upon reductive 
metrics and decision trees [56,57]. Innovative use of risk and uncertainty concepts in 
adaptation decision-making is now under way, requiring further development and 
application, such as the use of risk layering matched to different magnitudes of risk 
and their return periods [58], or the use of stress testing to assess critical natural 
capital required to maintain ecosystem services [59], or the use of robust decision-
making and dynamic adaptation pathways linked to trigger points that incorporate 
different prospective rates of climate change [60,61]. 
The fourth area relates to how current and planned policies and adaptation actions 
mediate climate risks, including the relations between adaptation policy aspirations, 
present adaptation action and adaptive capacity. The inclusion of adaptation action 
was a specific requirement for UKCCRA2, arguing that after several years of adaptation 
planning and policy-making it could be expected to see certain changes in adaptive 
behaviour that would in turn influence risk levels [34,42]. Evidence on adaptation is 
 emerging, as shown for infrastructure [35] and for business and industry [37], but this 
is mostly in a descriptive anecdotal rather than quantifiable or comparable form. 
Stakeholder engagement in the risk assessment process to generate at least anecdotal 
evidence and to collect views on adaptive capacity and barriers to action are important 
steps that can be taken in the absence of comprehensive adaptation data, but it limits 
the policy conclusions that can be drawn. Therefore, methodological advances to 
characterize adaptive capacity across different sectors as well as improved data 
collection and data sharing exercises are essential. Brown [36] also argues that for the 
natural environment we need a better characterization of natural adaptive capacity, 
and hence how climate resilience can be enhanced through linking human adaptation 
with natural adaptation processes. 
Another consistent conclusion from papers in this theme issue is the need for a more 
rigorous incorporation of adaptation effectiveness within risk assessments. This 
includes the viability of different adaptation processes (including reactive or proactive 
responses), for successfully addressing current and future climate change, together 
with sensitivity of their desired outcomes to irreducible uncertainty. Monitoring and 
evaluation data on adaptation are often lacking or extrapolated from small surveys or 
information from early adopters [62]. In addition, the variety and complexity of 
adaptation processes mean that the current generation of integrated assessment 
models, which are otherwise useful for understanding combined future climate and 
socioeconomic impacts, have been shown to be rather deficient in explicating the role 
of adaptation in mediating risks [63]. Risk assessment also requires better information 
on lead times required for converting policy aspiration into policy implementation, as 
such translation may be impeded or delayed by institutional or societal barriers [64], 
with implications for defining residual risks and the limits to adaptation, especially at 
higher magnitudes of climate change [28,65]. Understanding of response capacities 
also needs to extend in scope to investigate how prospects for better integration of 
adaptation and mitigation agendas may provide complementary initiatives to manage 
climate change risk in practice [66]. 
Finally, this theme issue provides insights on the challenges of applying risk 
assessments for adaptation decision-making. As seen in the UKCCRA context, there is 
a clear expectation from decision-makers in terms of applicability of the risk 
assessment, as highlighted by Brown et al. [42], who argue that ‘the next CCRA, due in 
2022, also needs to do more to articulate implicit or explicit outcomes in current policy 
design, and assess how adaptation actions can be made more effective’. Hence 
researchers need to embrace rather than avoid the adaptation science–policy– 
implementation nexus and recognize that ‘an improvement in resilience to climate 
 change across the country requires more than publishing a set of documents’ [42]. 
McDermott & Surminski [41] explore the interplay of climate risk assessment and 
normative decision-making at an urban level and show that, throughout any decision 
process, there are points where objective risk data meet subjective prioritization and 
normative judgements, and potentially controversy, for example, when setting 
‘acceptable risk levels’ and identifying ‘adequate’ protection levels, which can lead to 
controversy over competing priorities and differing perspectives on what should be 
given precedence. Recognizing these intersections early is important for those who 
conduct the risk assessment as well as those who use it. 
Several papers in this theme issue also refer to the rationale for public policy 
intervention and to ethical issues associated with risk. This highlights the increasing 
importance of linking climate change risk assessment with wider research on framing 
and communication of risk. This agenda would further position the conceptual and 
methodological innovations required beyond a conventional ‘objective’ risk 
assessment. It would recognize that risk is not an abstract concept but that it is 
necessarily subjective and strongly related to context, including attitudes to and 
tolerance for risk among different actors [67–69]. Such an agenda would be consistent 
with the wide diversity of contexts in which adaptation is taking place, including 
diverse perspectives on what is at stake in a changing climate. These perspectives are 
associated with divergent values and goals as, for example, associated with: the 
relative importance ascribed to the present versus future costs and benefits; on 
monetary against non-monetary risks; or on attitudes to average change compared to 
changes in extremes [70,71]. 
The most recent IPCC Fifth Assessment Report [22] has been the first to address how 
possible non-rational judgement and choice processes may interact with risk factors. 
A notable exemplar is use of heuristics in decision-making as a means to address risk 
complexity, information overload and bounded rationality; such heuristics may exhibit 
systematic biases related to risk perception (including loss aversion, cognitive myopia 
and preference for a status quo outcome). These perceptual issues may explain 
apparent paradoxes in adaptation when compared across different risks, including 
preferences for different types of adaptive response relative to risk type; social 
amplification of risk whereby perception can lead to overreaction [72]; or the 
reinforcement of maladaptive responses that purport to maintain the status quo as a 
‘low-risk strategy’ [73], as has been suggested for aspects of insurance and flood risk 
management [74]. These complications highlight the crucial need for systematic 
collation and interpretation of different responses within assessment procedures to 
 better understand residual risks and inform targeted policy interventions to reconcile 
residual risk with societal perceptions of tolerable risk. 
In summary, climate change risk assessment is playing for high stakes when individuals, 
organizations, national governments and intergovernmental assessments seek to 
systemize and make sense of the climate change challenge. The papers in this theme 
issue demonstrate the variety of those risks and the fundamental interaction of the 
physical risk with the societal processes of prioritizing, avoiding harm and making 
legitimate decisions. Although there are universal elements to risk, based on individual 
and perhaps evolutionary traits of humans [7], the diversity of national-level climate 
risk assessment, in particular, demonstrates the role of the cultural differences and 
understandings, making clear the priority given to consequences, actions and the 
acceptability of non-action. Climate change at the global scale is in effect a planetary 
experiment with unforeseeable outcomes in which those in the position to influence 
the decisions are taking the risks and eschewing precaution. 
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